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Abstract 
39 PRC State-owned enterprises ("SOEs") has raised HK$61.49m (up to December 31, 1997) 
through listing H-shares in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Yizheng Chemical and Harbin 
Power Equipment were the ‘best’ and 'worst' performance companies respectively in terms of 
the 250 trading days share price performance after IPO listing relative to Hang Seng Index. 
Five main areas, which may affect share price performance, are examined through case 
studies of both companies. They are agency costs, government control, asymmetric 
information, industry and strategy. As a result, four factors are discovered to create the 
difference in the share price performance between Yizheng Chemical and Harbin Power 
Equipment: incentive system - ownership structure, analyst coverage, industry and strategy. 
H share companies are recommended to upgrade incentive system of directors, enhance 
investors' relations and diversify business structure to reduce industry risk. 
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l.l. Why do we study H-share companies? 
From the 产 H-share company listing, Tsingtao Brewery, in 1993 to the end of 1997, 39 H-
share companies had already listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, and had raised 
about HK$61.49 billion】，through public offerings in Hong Kong, and international offerings 
and placing (See Appendix I). 
Figure 1 - Hang Seng Index vs. Hang Seng Chinese Enterpr ise Value (15/7/93 to 2/2/98) 
(Base Value o f b o t h indexes at July 15, 93 were equal to 100.) 
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At the beginning, listing of H-share companies created a dream for investors to share the 
growth of economy of the PRC. Investors were 'infected' by the H-share fever to subscribe 
their shares. The public offerings in Hong Kong of Tsingtao Brewery and Guangdong 
Shipyard had over 110.5 and 76 times of over-subscriptions. However, in 1995 and 1996, 
many H-shares companies reported disappointed results. For example, the 1996 annual result 
of Yizheng Chemical dropped 75% from previous year. In Figure 1, we can find that, from 
the end of 1993 to the end of 1995, the benchmark H-share index - Hang Seng China 
2 
Enterprise Index — had dropped by nearly 64% from its peak level to its lowest level, while 
the Hang Seng Index only dropped by 1% within the same period. 
When H-share companies found difficulties to attract investors, another format of Chinese 
enterprises — Red Chips companies - became the favour of investors. The Red Chip fever was 
due to expectations of asset injections into Red Chips by their mother companies. Owing to 
the success o f R e d Chips, in 1997, some troubled H-share companies, for example, Shanghai 
HaiXing (previous name of Shanghai Shipping Development) and Yizheng Chemical, 
announced to merge with similar SOEs, and created dreams of asset injections for investors. 
Under such dreams, the share price of these two companies raisecl up 10 and 3 times 
respectively. However, this H-share fever last shortly, and was ended in August, 97. Starting 
from August, 97, mainly owing to the Asian currency crisis. Hang Seng Chinese Enterprise 
dropped by 74% to an all time low 445.08 points, while Hang Seng Index only dropped by 
47%. 
After the 15'^  Communist Party meeting in September, 1997, the Central Government have 
announced its policies to privatize most small and medium SOEs in the next three years. 
However, from share price performance, investors have negative sentiment on investing H-
share companies. In order to privatize SOEs successfully, SOEs need to have necessary 
corporate reform or restructure to handle the concern of investors. 
In this paper, we will use case-study approaches to understand and analyze the problems of 
H-shares companies in raising capital, and find out the possible ways to improve their capital 
raising ability. 
1 Wardley Data Services Ltd. 
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l.ll. Why do PRC state-owned enterprises need to raise capital overseas? 
I.II.I. Capacity of PRC equity market 
The capacity of the PRC equity markets is growing very fast. However, in Figure 2, it is 
shown that the capacity of Hong Kong is at least 5 times bigger than that of the PRC market.“ 
Therefore, the equity market in the PRC may not provide enough capacity for capital raising 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It is possible that the picture of insufficient capacity may 
be distorted by the listing quota system imposed by the Central Government. Nevertheless, 
overseas listing can definitely provide additional channels of funding. Therefore, listing in the 
Hong Kong equity market can provide extra capacity for PRC SOEs. 
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I.II.II. Foreign Currency 
As the economy of the PRC is growing, the PRC needs a large amount of capital, especially 
foreign currency, to purchase machinery, raw materials and other assets for economic 
development. Since Renminbi is not easy to be converted into foreign currency, SOEs are 
2 China Securities & Futures Statistical Yearbook, 97; Annual Report of the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong, 97; The Nasdaq Slock Market 1997 Fact Book & Company Directory; Exchange rate RMB to 
HKD - (92-93) 0.78, (94-97) 1.07; HKD to USD - 7.80. 
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better to raise foreign capital directly to repay the debt and procure the necessary materials. 
Both Shenzhen B-share and Shanghai B-share markets allows SOEs to raise foreign capital in 
Hong Kong dollars and US dollars respectively. However, in 1996, the total market 
capitalization of these two B-share markets was only HK$36.81b®, only 1.37% of Hong 
Kong market capitalization in the same year. The relatively small B-share market is due to a 
weak legal systems and inadequate protection to investors. Therefore, overseas capital raising 
can provide a great opportunity to access the required capital in foreign currency. 
I.II.III. Accumulate experience for future SOEs reform 
Many management decisions of SOEs in the PRC are substantially influenced by policies of 
Central Government. Periodically, the PRC Central Government will carefully select a list of 
‘qualified，SOEs to list in overseas stock markets, including Hong Kong. The Central 
Government had made its intention that the overseas listing of high quality SOEs is to 
accumulate experience for future refomi ofSOEs. 
I.II.IV. Promotion 
Some SOEs, which export part of its products overseas, may find overseas listing helpftU in 
promoting the company image and exports. Moreover, to the PRC Central Government, 
overseas listing will also help to improve the image of the SOEs and the PRC economy 
reform. 
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l.lll. Why do most SOEs prefer listing in Hong Kong to listing in other 
places? 
According to Zhan (1994)3, ^^^ decisions of many SOEs to Table 1 - Hong Kong and 
New York Average P/E 
list in Hong Kong may be based on the following reasons: 
Year Hong New 
Kong York 
I.m.I. IPO P/E ratio in overseas market 1993 21.60 15.20 
1994 10.70 12.70 
Firstly, average P/E ratios in overseas market will greatly 
I ^ wO I 1.4U 14.UU 
affect the amount of capital raised of SOEs. Before, many 1996 16.40 15.70 
Source: China SecuriUes & 
companies refused to list in Hong Kong because of the low „ „ . . ,、， ^ , , � ^ , 
° ° Futures Statistical Yearbook 1997 
P/E ratios of the Hong Kong market. However, from Table 
1, we can find the average P/E ratio in Hong Kong market is comparable with thc average P/E 
ratio 16 in the US stock market. Therefore, the 'P/E ratio, problem is not as great as general 
investors perceived. 
Secondly, the actual P/E ratio will also be affected by investors' understanding on companies. 
For instance, in general. Hong Kong investors will understand more about the economic 
development of the PRC, and will have a higher confidence on the future development of 
SOEs than foreign investors. Therefore, Hong Kong investors, in general, are willing to pay a 
higher price for H-shares than foreign investors. 
Thirdly, the sizes of SOEs are comparatively larger than that of many listed companies in 
Hong Kong. However, the sizes of these SOEs in the United States are only medium. 
Therefore, listing of SOEs in Hong Kong will attract a greater attention and provide a greater 
confidence to investors. Then, investors will buy the stock at a higher P/E. 
3 Zhan Shao Shan "Development of China securities market", Worldwide publishing company，(1994) 
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I.III.II. Cost of listing: IPO & annual operation cost 
According to the case of Shanghai Petrochemical � , t h e listing fee in US was about US$20m, 
which was two times higher than that in Hong Kong. Moreover, the listing operation cost in 
Hong Kong was about US$200,000. But the operation cost in US was about US$400,000 per 
year. Therefore, the cost of listing in Hong Kong was lower than that in US. 
I.III.III. Understanding of the overseas market by SOEs management 
Management should understand the listing market such that they can communicate with the 
investment community more easily, for example, disclosure of appropriate information and 
promotion of its company to investors. Moreover, with a better understanding on the market, 
company can use the appropriate instruments to raise capital more easily at a suitable time. 
I.IV. Background of SOEs reform 
Before the 15'^  Communist Party Congress, there are 3 major stages of reform on PRC state 
owned enterprise: 1979 to 1983, 1984 to 1988 and 1989 to present. ^ 
I.IV.I. First stage (1979 to 1983) 
• Change from profit remittance system to tax system 
• Bonus system of employees: It provided incentives for workers in SOEs to improve labor 
productivity. 
• Government financing through bank loans instead ofbudgetary grant 
• Profit retention scheme: Enterprise could retain profit and output for further development 
4 Asian Development Bank "Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People's Republic of 
China, 1996", Oxford University Press, (1996) 
7 
I.IV.II. Second stage (1984 to 1988) 
• "Provisional Regulations on Expansion of Self-Management Powers in State-Run 
Enterprises": provided greater autonomy to enterprises in deciding their production mix, 
production level, labor compensation, investment and use of retained profits; increased 
the power of SOE manager and decreased the authority of party secretary in factory 
• Number of products under price controls decreased 
• Introduction of progressive bonus tax: decrcased the dispensation ofbonuses 
• Allowed the existence of different forms of ownership in 1984 and collective and private 
enterprises to enter many industries 
• Eliminate the restriction on the size ofTownship and Village Enterprise (TVE) 
• Income tax replaced by Contract Responsibility System (CRS) in 1987 
I.IV.III. Third stage (1989 to before 15'^  Communist Party Congress) 
• Issued Decree No.l03 "Regulations on Shift of Management Mechanism for the State-
Owned Industrial Enterprises" in 1992: Further expand managerial authority; control the 
growth of labor compensation; increase the responsibility ofSOEs for losses 
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I.V. Profile and Development of H-share companies 
The first H-share company, Tsingtao Brewery, listed in 1993. Up to the end of 1997, there are 
totally 39 H-share companies listed in Hong Kong. Table 2 ,Table 3 and Table 4 provides the 
general profile of H-shares companies. 
Table 2 - Profile ofH-share companies by year (from 93-97) 
Year Capital Raised No. of companies Average capital raised 
(HK$ m) listed per company (HK$ m)* 
9 3 8,140.09 6 1,356.68 
9 4 9,791.70 9 1,087.97 
9 5 3,091.28 2 1,545.64 
9 6 7,891.38 6 "1,315.23 
9 7 32,574.45 ^6 2,035.90 
Source: Wardley Data Services Ltd. 
Table 3 - Profile of H-share companies by industry (from 93-97) 
Rank Industry No. of Capital Raised % of total 
Companies (HK$ m) * 
1 Infrastructure 6 15,642.83 25.44% 
2 Oil & Petrochemical 6 12,569.88 20.44% 
3 Metal Mining 4 7,764.89 12.63% 
4 Aviation 2 7,693.01 12.51% 
5 Machinery 7 4,233.25 6.88% 
6 Power Supply 1 3,605.29 5.86% 
7 Shipping 2 1,904.19 3.10% 
8 Real Estate 1 1,696.85 2.76% 
9 Miscellaneous 2 1,360.50 2.21% 
Manufacturing 
1 0 Automobile 1 1,035.00 1.68% 
1 1 Electronics 2 896.06 1.46% 
1 2 Brewery 1 889.28 1.45% 
1 3 Raw Material 1 823.08 1.34% 
14 Electrical Appliances 1 738.96 1.20% 
1 5 Pharmaceutical 2 635.84 1.03% 
Total: 61,488.90 100.00% 
Source: Wardley Data Services Ltd. 
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Table 4 - Rank of H-share companies according to the size of capital raised (93-97) 
Rank Code Company Listing Date Total (HK$ m)* 
1 1055 China Southern Airlines Jul-97 5,528.94 
2 525 Guangshen Railway Company May-96 4,230.61 
3 338 Shanghai Petrochemical Jul-93 4,033.90 
4 323 Maanshan Iron & Steel Company Nov-93 3,932.32 
5 177 Jiangsu Expressway Jun-97 3,800.42 
6 991 Beijing Datang Mar-97 3,605.29 
7 576 Zhejiang Expressway May-97 3,412.57 
8 1033 Yizheng Chemical Mar-94 3,360.00 
9 670 China Eastern Airlines Corporation Feb-97 2,164.06 
10 325 Beijing Yanhua Jun-97 1,781.12 
11 588 Beijing North Star May-97 1,696.85 
12 107 Sichuan Expressway Sep-97 1,683.20 
13 358 Jianxi Copper Company Ltd. Jun-97 1,674.03 
14 548 Shenzhen Expressway Mar-97 1,643.40 
15 1138 China Shipping Development Ltd. Nov-94 1,576.80 
16 368 Jilin Chemical Industrial Company Ltd. May-95 1,558.86 
17 38 First Tractor Jun-97 1,507.50 
18 347 Angang New Steel Jun-96 1,450.70 
19 1128 Zhenhai Refining Dec-94 1,428.00 
20 1133 Harbin Power Equipment Company Dec-94 1,210.41 
21 1122 Qingling Textile Aug-94 1,035.00 
22 1108 Luoyang Glass Company Jul-94 912.50 
23 168 Tsingtao Brewery Company Ltd. Jul-93 889.28 
24 995 Anhui Expressway Nov-96 872.63 
25 914 Anhui Conch Qct-97 823.08 
26 921 Guangdong Kelon Jul-96 738.96 
27 1053 Chongqing Iron & Steel Company Ltd. Oct-97 707.84 
28 553 Nanjing Panda Electronics Company Apr-96 515.46 
29 1072 DongfangElectricalMachinery Jun-94 431.10 
30 42 Northeast Electrical Transmission & Jul-95 464.31 
Transformation Machinery Manufacturing 
31 1202 Chengdu Telecommunications Cable Co. Dec-94 448.00 
32 1065 Tianjin Bohai May-94 408.00 
33 161 CATIC Shenzhen Holdings Sep-97 380.60 
34 874 Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Company Oct-97 362.84 
35 317 GuangzhouShipardlnternationalCompany Aug-93 327.39 
36 719 Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Dec-96 273.00 
37 350 Jingwei Textile Machinery Company Feb-96 233.23 
38 187 Beiren Printing Machinery Aug-93 208.00 
39 300 Kunming Machine Tool Company Dec-93 128.70 
Source: Wardley Data Services Ltd. * 1 USD = 7.8 HKD 
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|.VI. PRC SOEs equity shareholding structure 
Shares of PRC SOEs are mainly divided into two categories: non-negotiable shares and 
negotiable shares. The major difference is the latter type can be traded under the Automatic 
Quotation System of stock exchanges in the PRC, but not the former one. The definition of 
other types of shares are listed as follows: 
Table 5 - Types of shares o f P R C SOEs 
Types Descriptions 
Non-negotiable Shares 
1. Sponsor's Shares 
State-owned shares Held by state-owned entities only, set in light of the 
<<lnterim Measures on the Administration of State-
owned shares issued by the Limited Companies>> 
Domestic Legal Person's Shares Held by domestics legal person only 
Foreign Legal Person's Shares Held by foreign legal person only (includes 
merchants from overseas, Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan etc.) 
2. Private Placement Held by foreign legal person, raised before the 
enforcement of Company Law 
3. Staff Shares Held by staff shares, raised before the enforcement 
of Company Law 
Negotiable Shares 
1. A Shares Held by domestic investors, traded in Renminbi 
2. B Shares Held by foreign investors, traded in HKD (in 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange) or in USD (in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange) 
3. H Shares Listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, traded 
in HKD 
4. Others N-shares: Listed in the New York Stock Exchange; 
S-shares: Listed in the Singapore Stock Exchange 




Over 95% of equity capital raised by SOEs through H-shares listing is in the format of initial 
public offerings (IPOs) and placing raised at the same time (Appendix I). It is rational that if 
investors believe share price would increase in the future, they will subscribe or buy the 
shares even at a higher price. Therefore, it is important to understand the factors, which will 
increase the shareholder value of H-share companies. This paper would focus on studying the 
aftermarket IPO performance of H-share companies to study what factors would affect the 
shareholders value after listing. Moreover, we have adopted a case study approach in this 
paper to complement to other theoretical studies on SOEs and H-share companies. 
There are some studies to address the aftermarket performance of IPOs in US. Moreover, the 
studies of IPO of H share are not many so far. 
Ritter(1991)5 analyzed US IPO cases 1975-84 and concluded that “there is substantial 
variation in the under-performance year to year and across industries, with companies that 
went public in high-volume years faring the worst." This pattem are consistent with an IPO 
market in which investors are periodically overoptimistic about earnings potential of young 
growth companies and firms take advantage of these “windows of opportunity ." 
Hensler, Rutherford and Springer(1997)^ examined the factors which affect the survival of 
IPO in the aftermarket. Their conclusion is that “the survival time for IPOs increases with 
size, age of the firm at the offering, the initial return, IPO activity level in the market, and the 
percentage of insider ownership, while the survival time decreases with increases in the 
5 Jay R. Ritter, "The Long nm performance of initial public offerings". The Joumal of Finance Vol. 
XLVI No. 1 (March 1991) 
I 
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general market level at the time of the offering and the number of risk characteristics." And 
also the survivability is also affected by industry like negatively in the computer and data, 
wholesale, restaurant, or airline industries and positively in the optical or drug industries. 
Chan(1995)7 studied specifically on H share companies. He addressed three problems of H 
share companies: agency costs problem, asymmetric information problem and conflict of 
interests. Agency costs problem is caused by the fact that the majority share holders of SOEs 
are still Government entities. The agency objective to maximize the share holders value is 
sometimes different from the Government objective. 
The first criterion to select these two companies for case study is “share price appreciation 
(PA) relative to Hang Seng Index (HIS) after 250 trading days (approximately one year after 
the first trading day)” (We assume the market is efficient, and the closing price of first 
trading day would reflect the intrinsic value of the company .) 
PA to HSI = PAstock/PAHSI 
PAstock = Share price at the first trading day/Share price at 250 days later 
PAHSI = HSI at the first corresponding trading day of the H- share/HSI at 250 days 
later 
Out o f 3 9 H share companies, only 24 companies had more than 250 trading days. Therefore, 
we selected the best and worst companies among the 24 companies. 
6 Hensler, Rutherforld, Springer, "The Survival of IniUal Public Offerings in the Aftennarket", The 
Journal ofFinancial Research. Vol. XX, No. 1 93-110，(Spring 1997) 
7 Chan Hing-lin, "An alternative to Privatization: the listing of H-shares in Hong Kong", Hong Kong 
Baptist University (1995) 
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The second criterion is the IPO year. According to Ritter(1991), We can minimize the 
variation due to stock markets i f w e select two companies which went to public in the same 
year. 
As a result, we selected Yizheng Chemical Fibre as the best performance company and 
Harbin Power Equipment Company Limited as the worst one (Appendix II). Comparing the 
two cases will allow us to uncover insights for further discussion of key factors to ftind 
raising in Hong Kong market. 
The framework to compare is the following five areas which may mostly affect their earning 
and share price. These five factors are: 
• Agency Cost 
• Government Control 
• Asymmetric Information 
• Industry 
• Strategy 
In addition to ordinary factors, we also consider the government factors because majority 
shareholders of most SOEs are still government entities. We also think "investor relation" is 
important in order for SOEs to create trustftil relationship between the companies and 
investors. 
Framework of Comparison 
ll.l. Agency cost problems 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)^ defined the agency cost as the sum of (1) the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual 
8 Jensen and Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure" Journal of Financial Economics 3 305-360, (1976) 
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loss. When managers (agents) do not share the same objectives with shareholders in a 
company, managers cannot endeavor to maximize shareholders' value. This agcncy cost 
problem, which may happen in any company without an appropriate management structure 
and corporate governance, will directly affect its future profitability and share price 
performance. As Chan (1995) ? pointed out, this problem is a cause of "conflict of interests" 
such as the issue of layoff, raising public-utility charge or commodity price, etc.. Top 
management staff in SOEs "views their job as a stepping stone to a more rewarding position 
o f the bureaucratic ladder because they are mostly government officers” 
Morck (1988)9 mentioned at low levels of management equity ownership, an increase in their 
shareholdings more closely aligns managers' and outside shareholders' interests. Beyond 
some point, further increases effectively insulate managers from outside shareholder 
demands, but allocate corporate resources in their own self-interest. Bagnani (1994)^® 
mentioned that when managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership 
increases management's incentives to increase stockholder wealth at the expense of 
bondholder wealth. 
• Management 
Study the background and experience of management, management structure, their 
relationship with local and/or central Government. 
• HRM strategy 
Measure the percentage of management equity ownership, and their remuneration. 
9 Morck, R.A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny，"Management Ownership and market valuation: An 
empirical analysis", Joumal ofFinancial Economics 20, (1988) 
10 Elizabeth Strock Bagnani, Nikolaos T. Milonas, Anthony Saunders, Nickolaos G. Travlos, 
"Managers, Owners, and the pricing of risky debt: an empirical analysis", The Joumal of Finance (June 
1994) 
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11.11. Government control 
According to Chan (1995) \ principals and agents of H-share companies have the conflict of 
interest. Majority shareholders of all H-share companies are government departments or 
organizations. The establishment of SOEs in the PRC, including H-share companies, is to 
serve the needs of the whole nation. However, the national interest may not be the same of 
that of H-share holders, which is to maximize the profit and shareholders' value. Such 
potential interest conflicts may affect the confidence of H-share holders and ultimately affect 
the share price performance. 
• Degree of regulation on industries(e.g. control on price and competition) 
Study how the regulations of Central and/or local government affect the sales and profits 
of the companies, for example, taxation, import custom 
• Central and local government relations 
Investigate any significant events caused by Central and/or local government (majority 
shareholder) who had different interest from minority shareholders. 
Il.lll. Asymmetric Information 
Asymmetric Information consists of three problems: the selection problem, the hidden action 
problem and the costly state verification problem (Hillier (1997)"). The selection problem is 
caused by the knowledge difference between investors and management. The hidden action 
problem is that the investors can not observe the investment decision by management because 
of their hidden action. The last one is that investors are required to pay costs to have a 
transparency of management. 
“Hiller, Brian, "The Economics of Asymmetric Information", Macmillan Press Ltd. (1997) 
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As A k e r l o f ( l % 6 y 2 mentioned, purchasers have to identify good products from bad products. 
There is considerable evidence that quality variation is greater in underdeveloped, for 
instance. Mainland China, than in developed areas. Lack of trust will drive investors out o f H -
share market. Certain "guarantee" should be made to investors to build up the trust of 
investors. 
The quantity and quality of information disclosed by management of H-share companies are 
highly affected by the degree of trust to investors of management and their management 
behaviour. Without sufficient transparency, investors do not have enough confidence on the 
future performance of H-share companies, and sell the shares, which will results in lower 
share prices. Craven and Marston (1997)'^ mentioned that the meetings between management 
and investors, and use of non-executive chairman can reduce information asymmetry. 
• Information disclosure 
Study how often the companies disclose its information to general public and other 
interest groups, for example, equity analyst, and the quality of information - difference 
between the information disclosed and the real results. 
• Accomplishment of the plans in prospectus and annual reports 
Find out how many objects and projects, which were promised or forecast in the annual 
reports, could not been achieved and accomplished. 
II.IV. Industry 
Porter (1985)14 j^ad pointed out that "the first fundamental determinant of a firm's 
profitability is industry attractiveness." Moreover, the collective strength of the five forces: 
12 George A. Akerlof, "The market for "Lemons" quality uncertainty and the market mechanism", 
Quarterly Journal ofEconomics (1966) 
13 B.M. Craven and C1. MarsUm, "Investor Relations and Corporate Governance in Large UK 
Companies", Corporate Governance (Vol. 5, Number 3, July 1997) 
M Michael E. Porter, "Competitive Advantage", Free Press (1985) 
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threat of potential entrants, bargaining power of buyers, threat of substitute products and 
services, bargaining power of suppliers, threat of new entrants and rivalry among existing 
firms, determines the ability of firms in an industry to eam, on average, rates of retum on 
investment in excess of the cost ofcapital. Therefore, if the profitability of the whole industry 
is going up, the profit of a company will also rise. Therefore, we attempt to understand how 
the industry affects the profits ofH-share companies by applying: 
• Industry growth rate and Product life cycle and 
• Porter's five forces model 
II.V. Strategy 
According to Porter (1985) '^ positioning determines whether a firm's profitability is above 
or below the industry average. The successes of these strategies will ultimate increase their 
profits. We will specially focus on studying any strategic changes of H-share companies 
before and after listing, and comparing their strategies with other comparable companies: 




Investigate what is the key competitive strategy, and how well the companies perform. 
Finally, we may have a certain limitation to draw a generalized conclusion from our project, 
because our approach is Case methods. However, we believe our research will be a base for 
the further study o f H share companies. 
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CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDY: YIZHENG CHEMICAL FIBRE COMPANY LTD. 
Ill.l. Background 
Yizheng Chemical Fibre Company Ltd. (“Yizheng’，）(SEHK Code: 1033) is a jo in t stock PRC 
state-owned enterprise. It was the seventh state-owned enterprise listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Hong Kong and was listed on March 29, 1994. The principle business of 
Yizheng is to produce and distribute polyester products. Yizheng is the 4^ ^ largest polyester 
producer in the world. In 1996, its production capacity represented 44.8% of the total 
polyester production capacities in the PRC and the PRC market accounted for 94.6% of the 
total sales ofYizheng. 
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Source: Yizheng 94 H-share lisUng prospectus and annual Reports 
History 
In response to the severe shortage of natural fibres in the PRC, the PRC Government had 
identified the polyester industry, especially synthetic fibre industry, as a priority for further 
development in the Fifth Five-year Plan (1976-1980). Finally, the State Council approved the 
establishment of polyester production facilities - Yizheng Joint Corporation of Chemical 
Fibre Industry ("YJC"), holding company of Yizheng. The project was established in the 
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Yizheng City, capital of Jiangsu Province. The plant construction was divided into two phases 
- P h a s e I and Phase II completed in 1987. (Refer to Table 15, P.31) 
Listing 
In December, 1981, YJC was established as a joint limited liability, 70% owned by the 
Textile Ministry (presently called 'Textile Council") and 30% owned by CITIC, to take over 
the production facilities. Being a state-owned enterprise, YJC had to undergo a restructuring 
into a joint stock limited company before listing (Figure 4). On December 31, 1993, Yizheng 
was established under YJC. Then, Yizheng listed its shares as followings: 
• Listed 1 billion H-shares in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong on March 29, 1994 at 
HK$2.38 per share (international over-subscription: 9x; public over-subscription: 20.2lx) 
• Listed 200m A-shares in the Shanghai Stock Exchange on April 11, 1995 at RMB 2.68 
per share; 
• Listed 400m H-shares in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong on April 26, 1995 at 2.45 per 
share(US$31.68 per ADR) 
Table 6 - Share Capital Structure 
Share type Category Owner No. of shares (m) % 
A-share Legal Person Yihua Group Corp. ("Yihua") 1,680 42 
(formerly called YJC) 
LegalPerson China International Trust & 720 18 
Investment Group ("CITIC") 
Public 1 ^ 200 5 
H-share Public | ^ 1,400 35 
Total 100 
Source: Wardley Data Services Ltd. 
The listing lead manager ofYizheng was S.G. Warburg Securities, which is now called SBC 
Warburg Dillion Read. 
Usage of Capital raised from all H-share and A-share is as follows: 
• Repayment of outstanding foreign currency borrowings relating to Phase I & II; 
• Capital required for Phase III development to increase the production capacity 
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• For working capital � 
Figure 4 - Ownership restructuring of Yizheng 
Textile Council 
CITIC Ministry ofTextile ^ 讚 � ~ 
(Presently called Textile Council) CITIC Yihua Group Corp. 
— " ^ " r j _ _ Z r 
_ 18% r^ ^ 
30% 70% Yizheng Chemical 
~ ~ ^ ^ ~ ~ 。 t ^ " t 50/0 
Yizheng Joint Corp of Chemical 35/� 
Fibre Industry (YJC) Issue new H shares issue new A shares 
Ownership Structure: Ownership Structure: 
1982 (Before restructuring) April, 1998(After restructuring) 
Source: Yizheng 94 H-shares listing prospectus and annual reports 
In 1995, Phase III development was completed. In 1997, State Council approved the merge of 
the Yihua Group Corporation with other 3 petrochemical state-owned enterprise. (Section 
III.III.V). In March 1998, the detailed development plan of Phase IV was approved by the 
State Council. Details ofhistory ofYizheng refer to Appendix III. 
Figure 5 - Relative Share Price Performance of Yizheng (First trading day = 100) 
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After listing its H-shares in March 1994 for one year, the share price ofYizheng raised 30% 
relative to the Hang Seng Index. However, because of the poor financial results, its share 
price dropped against Hang Seng Index afterwards. From July 30, 97 to the following weeks, 
the share price suddenly increased by nearly 200% because Yihua, parent company of 
Yizheng, announced to merge with other petrochemical companies, and the investment public 
hoped assets would be injected into Yizheng in the future. Afterwards, the share price 
dropped. Especially after the market turmoil in October 1997, it reached the lowest pnce 
HK$0.54 on January 23, 1998 which was only 23% of its listing price. 
Ill.ll. Agency Cost 
We assess the possibility of existence of agency cost in Yizheng by analyzing the following 
information of management: 
• Management Structure 
• Management Ownership of the company 
• Remuneration 
III.II.I. Management Structure 
Table 7 lists the management structure of Yizheng. In 1996, board of directors comprised 10 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































From Table 8, we observe that h a l f o f t h e directors have worked in Government departments. 
4 directors are presently management of Textile Council. Textile Council, reorganized from 
Ministry of Textile, was a government organization to regulate the Textile industry in the 
PRC. It wholly owned the YJC, which was the majority shareholder of Yizheng. Chan 
(1995)7 mentioned management in H-share companies with governmental background might 
use their positions as step stones for senior positions. Therefore, representatives from ultimate 
majority shareholders. Textile Council, can effectively protect its interest. However, potential 
agency problems may exist because of the difference between the objectives of management 
and shareholders. 
Table 8 - Previous/Present Government Positions of Yizheng Directors 
Name Positions Previous/Present Government Positions 
Ms. Wu Wen-ying C President of Textile Council 
Mr. Ren Chuan-jun VC Vice-President of Textile Council 
Mr. Chang Jun- ED Head of Personnel Resources Department ofthe Textile 
chuan Council 
Mr. Yang Dong-hui ED Head of Economic Adjustment Department of the Textile 
Council 
Mr. Yuan Bao-hua NED Previous Vice-Minister of State Planning Commission 
Mr. Zhang Yao-hua NED Previous Major of Nanjing 
Source: Yizheng 94 H-shares listing prospectus 
Under Exchange Listing Rules Section 3.10 and 19A.20(1), board of directors of all locally 
listing Chinese companies must include at least two independent non-executive directors. 
These two independent non-executive directors must not involve into any management affairs 
of the company and not have shareholdings greater than 1%. They should be able to 
demonstrate an acceptable standard of competence and adequate commercial or professional 
experience to ensure that the interests of the general body of shareholders will be adequately 
represented. In Yizheng annual reports, we can only find two non-executive directors. 
Through our telephone interviews, the representative from the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong 
described these two non-executive directors should be the two independent non-executive 
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directors of Yizheng. However, Mr. Yuan Bao-hua had worked for various Government 
officials, and Mr. Zhang Yao-hua had worked for YJC and was General Manager ofYJC until 
1983. Although both of them are independent non-executive directors, their past experience 
with the PRC Government and YJC may show they are not really independent as expected. 
III.II.II. Remuneration 
Table 9 listed the remuneration and bonus given to different categories of management from 
1994 to 1996. Every management in the category receives the same level of salary. 
Table 9 - Remuneration & Bonus of management in Yizheng 
Salary & other remuneration for the Executive Supervisors Senior Manager 
year (RMB) Director 
^ ^ 46,000 30,000 30,000 
1 ^ 47,808 39,840 39,840 
^996 59,330 49,441 49,441 
Salary Growth Executive Supervisors Senior EPS growth 
Rate (%) Director Manager rate (%) 
1993 vs. 1994 � � | ^ 24.19% 
1994 vs. 1995 3.93% 32.80% 32.80% 1.95% 
1995 vs. 1996 24.10% 24.10% 24.10% -82.80% 
Bonus for the Executive Supervisors Senior 
year (RMB) Director Manager 
199 4 10,000 8,000 8,000 
199 5 10,000 8,000 8,000 
199 6 10,000 8,000 8,000 
Source: Yizheng annual reports 
In the past few years, the remuneration growth rate was higher than that EPS growth rate. It is 
mainly due to the service contract of directors entered in 1994. The listing prospectus of 
Yizheng stated that: 
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"The aggregate annual salaries payable to all the Executive Directors is RMB 360,000 (divided equally 
between them) subject to an increment (after inflation) of not less than 18%, but not more than 40% 
for each subsequent year within the contract term” 
However, prospectus and annual reports did not mention which entity was responsible to 
decide the amount of salary increase. 
The listing prospectus also stated terms concerning bonus for management: 
"Each of the executive directors is entitled to a management bonus by reference to the consolidated net 
profit of the Company (excluding extraordinary items) after taxation and minority interests as decided 
by the Board of Directors provided that the annual amount of bonus payable to each of the Executive 
Directors may not less than RMB 10,000 and tlie annual aggregate of bonus payable to all the 
executive Directors may not exceed 1% of such profit." 
It is unusual to let board of directors to decide their own bonus although only the lowest level 
of bonus was granted in the last few years The system allows potential agency problem to 
happen. 
In 1997, a new service contract was signed with more favourable terms: 
• Annual aggregated salaries were revised from RMB 360,000 to RMB 480,000. 
• Minimum bonus was revised from RMB 10,000 to RMB 15,000. 
Remuneration of directors in H-share companies is typically lower than that in other locally 
listed companies. We agree appropriate annual adjustment in remuneration is necessary to 
increase the motivation of management. However, in the case of Yizheng, remuneration of 
directors does not account for the performance of the companies. Especially in the case of 
1995 (See Section III.IV.III below), potential negligence of management might have 
happened in 1995. But there was still a large salary increase in every level of management. 
Together without further explanation of the reasons for such large increase, agency problem 
may exist in Yizheng. 
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III.II.III. Management Ownership 
Table 10 - Shareholdings of directors & other management of Yizheng 
No. o fAshares held 2 ^ ^ J ^ 1996 
Directors 
Ren Chuan-jun 3,000 3,000 3,000 
Chen Jin-fang 2,800 2,800 2,800 
Zhu Ke-Ii 2,800 2,800 2,800 
(3outo f12)* (3 out o f12) (3 out o f12) 
Supervisors 
Ren Yong-liang 2,300 N/A N/A 
Qian Heng-ge N/A 2,000 2,000 
Huang Gui-geng 2,300 2,300 2,300 
Fang Xiao-juan 2,300 2,300 2,300 
(3 out of 5) (3 out of 5) (3 out of 5) 
Genior Management 
Xu Zheng-ning 2,600 2,600 2,600 
Ling Ai-bao 2,600 2,600 2,600 
Zheng Da-zhong 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Wang Shi-Iin 2,600 2,600 2,600 
Jiang Shi-cheng 2,800 2,800 2,800 
Jiang Yi-fen 2,600 N/A N/A 
Fang Han-ping 2,000 N/A N/A 
(8 out of 8) (6 out of 7) (6 out of 7) 
Totalnumberofsharesownedby 34,300 29,400 29,400 
management 
Total number of outstanding shares 3,400,000,000 4,000,000,000 4,000,000,000 
% amount of management ownership 0.0010% 0.0007% 0.0007% 
* - (3 out of 12) means 3 directors out of 12 have owned shares in Yizheng. 
Source: Yizheng annual reports 
In Yizheng, some directors and supervisors owned shares of Yizheng. However, this amount 
of share ownership by management is low to have enough incentives to serve the best interest 
of shareholders. ^ '° 
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lll.lll. Government Control 
III.III.I. Product and raw material prices 
Before 1992, all polyester product prices were set by the Commodities Price Bureau. 
Afterwards, the polyester chip and staple fibre prices were deregulated in 1993 and 1994 
respectively. Moreover, the prices of raw materials - PX, PTA and MEG'^ were also 
deregulated. The Government control on both product and raw materials prices are weak. 
However, in 1996, worldwide PTA supply could not meet the demand. But Yangzi 
Chemical's PTA price decreased from RMB 12,550 (4Q95) to RMB 11,600 (lQ96), and its 
selling price for Yizheng was lower than that'^. Government can still control the prices 
indirectly. 
III.III.II. Taxation 
According to a directive (Cai Shui Zie 11997] No. 38) dated March 3, 1997 issued by the PRC 
State Tax Bureau and the Ministry of Finance, the rate of income tax payable by Yizheng was 
confirmed to be 15%, as compared to 33% applicable to other PRC domestic enterprises.-'^ 
Income tax rates applicable to the Yizheng principal subsidiaries in the PRC range from 15% 
to 33%. This decision of the PRC Government can improve the shareholder value ofYizheng. 
III.III.III. Import custom 
Government charges a high customs on the r^  . , . . , 丄 ^ „ 
lable 11 - import custom of 
imported products and Yizheng can sell products Yizheng products 
• , . , . . , , „ Staple fibre Filament 
at a higher price in the short run. However, i f the 
1992-93 30% 50% 
PRC join the WTO in the future, the import 1994-96 28% 45% 
. •,, , j j , . ,, , , Source: Yizheng annual reports 
custom will be reduced substantially and the 
competitiveness ofYizheng will be doubtful. 
15 PX - Paraxylene, PTA - Purified TerephUialic Acid, and MEG - MonoEUiylene Glycol 
16 Hong Kong Economic Times (96/2/1) 
28 
IILIII.IV. Product mix 
Since Yizheng was originally established by Ministry of Textile (now called Textile Council), 
its product range would be mainly focused on polyester fibre. Polyester industry is cyclical in 
nature. Ritter (1991)'^ found that market less prefer those cyclical industries with potentially 
higher risk. Therefore, a typical large-scale petrochemical company, like Yizheng, would 
diversify its product mix. 
On June 27, 1996'^, Yizheng announced its Phase IV development proposal (Appendix III) 
which included development of production facilities for PX, an important raw materials for 
Yizheng. Then, Sinopec, subsidiary of Ministry of Chemical, had reservation on the Phase IV 
development of Yizheng because the upstream petrochemical products were typically 
produced by Sinopec's subsidiaries and Yizheng was belonged to Textile Council. 
Eventually, the PX development plan was excluded in the finalized Phase IV development. 
Therefore, development of Yizheng would be potentially subject to the influence of Central 
and local governments. 
III.III.V. Mergers & Acquisition under Government Policies 
According to the Minister of Chemical Industry, 100 or more large chemical firms will be 
encouraged to merge to become about 55 conglomerates by 2000. The aim is to create several 
world-scale conglomerate giants by 2010. As proposed by the State Council, Yizheng 
Chemical Fiber's parent, Yihua group, will bc merged with 3 neighbouring chemical firms: 
Yangtze Petrochemical (refining/petrochemicals) ("Yangtze"), Jinling Chemical (refining), 
and Nanhua Chemical (inorganic chemicals). It will help Yizheng to save 20% of its required 
17 1996 Yizheng Chemical Annual Report 
18 Jay R. Ritter, "The Long run performance of initial public offerings". The Journal of Finance Vol. 
XLVI No. 1 (March 1991) 
19 Hong Kong Economic Times (96/8/27) 
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volume.2o Yangtze was belonged to the Ministry of Chemical, and actually developed, 
together with Yizheng, under the same project of the Fifth Five-year Plan to solve the 
problem of severe shortage of natural fibre.^' And it was the major supplier of Yizheng. 
Therefore, the direct value created for Yizheng is to have certain amount of raw materials 
supply from Yangtze and the price of raw materials will be more favourable to Yizheng. 
Actually, the share price ofYizheng increased substantially after the news of mergers because 
the investment public expected Yizheng and other H-share companies would have a series of 
asset injections similar to that of red chips in Hong Kong. 
III.III.VI. Government intervention on capital raising decisions 
Before H-share listing, Yizheng had already been approved by State Council Securities 
Commission to issue 600m new A-shares. '^ However, on September 16, 1995, Yizheng 
announced it cancelled the plan to issue 400m A-shares and instead issue 400m H-shares. 
"This is a favourite stock of foreigners, but they may be proved wrong this time and this 
decision could affect confidence “ said Ambrose Chang, fund manager at East Asian Harrison 
Asset Management.22 
Initially, Yizheng planned to use proceeds from A-share listing for its expansion plans, 
repayment of bank borrowings and working capital. Owing to the austerity programme in 
1994, the investment sentiment was very weak in both stock exchanges in the PRC. On 
August 3, 1994, China Securities Regulatory Commission announced no A-sharc could be 
listed in 1994 in order to eliminate the adverse effect of the new supply on the market. The A_ 
share listing plan ofYizheng was delayed to 1995. In January 1995, Yizheng only issue 200m 
20 Goldman Sachs China Research (97/9/15) 
21 Yizheng 94 H-share listing prospectus 
22 Herald Tribune (95/2/21) 
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A-share which was only one third of its original plan. Owing to the weak trading volume, the 
listing of these A-shares in Shanghai Stock Exchange was delayed to April 11, 1995. 
According to the H-shares listing prospectus (P.6) of Yizheng: “In the event that the new A 
Share issue is not completed, alternative sources of financing will have to considered to 
provide funds... ". Owing to the capital needs for further development, on March 16, 1995, 
Yizheng announced to change its plan to issue 400m H-shares instead. This financing change 
would have the same effect of dilution in earnings per shares. However, owing to the 
structural difference between A-share and H-share, new issuance of 400m H-shares would 
increase the supply of H-shares by 40%. From Figure 6, we can observe that after issuance 
announcement, the share price of Yizheng has dropped 9.43% within one week, but Hang 
Seng Index rose 1.48% at the same time. And their break of 'promise’ did affect the 
confidence of investment public on Yizheng and H-shares as a whole in the long run. 
Figure 6 — Share Price Performance after new H-shares issuance announcement 
(Relative value on March 13，1995 = 100) 
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Source: Datastream 
Eventually, the issuance of new H-shares was approved by the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong, China Securities Regulatory Commission and annual general meetings of both A and 
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H-shares. And new 400m H-shares were listed in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in April 
1995. 
"It is policy problem in China. They're trying to intervene in the market a bit too much，’ said 
Ambrose Chang. ^^  It is a typical story about government control on state-owned enterprise 
and the interest conflicts among different categories of shareholders. In order to protect the 
PRC stock market, China Securities Regulatory Commission ignored the previous approval 
and did not allow Yizheng to issue A-shares in 1994. Moreover, the majority shareholder of 
Yizheng held A-share instead of H-shares. Issuance of H-shares will only be harmful to the 
H-share price but not the A-shares. But it hurt the confidence ofbotK the H-share holders and 
other investment public. 
III.IV. Asymmetric Information 
III.IV.I. Analyst coverage 
There are about 25 investment banks and 35 equity analysts evaluating the performance of 
Yizheng.23，where, for example, only 14 banks cover Zhejiang Expressway, 19 banks cover 
Zhenhai Refining and 16 banks cover Harbin Power Equipment. (Section IV.IV.I). This result 
is due to many different factors, for example, larger market capitalization of Yizheng and 
regional market exposure of Yizheng. However, it undoubtedly reduces the asymmetric 
information between investment public and management. 
III.IV.II. Investment of Institutional Investors 
Yizheng successfully placed its H-shares to several strategic international institutional 
investors when it listed on March 1994: 
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Table 12 - Strategic Investors of Yizheng 
Name No. of shares owned % of H-shares No. of shares {m) 
in March 1994 (m) (in March 1994) (on 30/6/97) 
Amoco Far East Ltd. 25 2.5% 21.5 
(Presently called "Amoco 
Chemicals Asia Pacific Ltd.) 
ICI China Ltd. ^ 2.5% ^ 
Mitsui & Co. Ltd. 5 0.5% M 
Bank of China - China Fund ;[0 1.0% H 
Total: _65 6 ^ | ^ 
Source: Wardley Data Services Ltd. and Yizheng 94 H-shares listing prospectus 
The first 3 companies are well known international companies and were major suppliers of 
Yizheng. Their investment in Yizheng improved the confidence of the investment public to 
Yizheng. However, on June 30, 1997, the shareholding of all these strategic investors were 
reduced. Since the usual investment horizon of institutional investors is usually long-term, 
their divestment may mean these investors were pessimistic on the future prospect of 
Yizheng. 
III.IV.III. Incorrect forecast on product prices and profit margin 
Although the product prices of Yizheng had dropped 10% from its peak in 1995, on August 
31，1995, Managing Director of Yizheng, Mr. Chen Jin-fang forecasted the product prices 
would increase from October because demand of textile industry in the PRC would increase."^ 
In November, 1995, Nava Securities published analyst forecast to wam investors about the 
1995 earnings because the prices of raw materials increased substantially, and many textile 
companies in the PRC incurred loss in 1995. Afterwards, both Nava Securities and Salomon 
Brothers Securities had revised the earnings forecast ofYizheng in 1995 and 1996 by 20% to 
40%, and published SELL recommendations to investors.^"^ 
23 Bloomberg - Nelson services (98/3/04) 
24 Hong Kong Economic Times (95/9/1) 
25 Hong Kong Economic Times (95/11/17) 
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Table 13 - Financial Results of Yizheng 
RMB (m) 94 95 ?6 
1H 2H 1H 2H 1H 2H 
Turnover 3031 3186 4397 4905 3482 3517 
Net Profit 461 517 836 377 212 3 
Profit margin 15% 16% 19% 8% 6% 0% 
Comparing with last year same period 
Turnovergrowth (%) N/A N/A 45% 54% -21% -28% 
Profit growth (%) N/A N/A 81% -27% -75% -99% 
Source: Yizheng annual reports 
On January31, 1996, Managing Director of Yizheng, Mr. Chen Jin-fang forecast the eamings 
of Yizheng would still have satisfactory increase 26 However, on March 27, Yizheng 
announced the profit margin in 2"^ half of 1995 was decreased substantially without previous 
warnings. Moreover, Managing Director of Yizheng, Mr. Chen Jin-fang said "Judging from 
the situation in the first quarter, we are confident we can maintain the same profit margin as 
last year''27. However, from Table 13，the results of Yizheng are far from the forecast of 
management. 
Negligence might happen in Yizheng because Mr. Chen mentioned the higher inventory 
squeezed the group's current working capital, leading to a substantial rise in short-term 
borrowings. 
III.IV.IV. Acquisition of Foshan Chemical Fibre Complex 
On August 25, 1995, Yizheng announced it had acquired Foshan Chemical Fibre Complex 
and its related companies ("FCF") successfully. Management mentioned the major reason for 
this acquisition is to achieve the ninth five-year plan. However, the acquisition has incurred a 
substantial loss to Yizheng. 
26 Hong Kong Economic Times (96/2/1) 
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Before acquisition, FCF was the fifth largest polyester producer in the PRC with production 
of polyester chips at 27,000 tonnes, polyester fibre at 10,600 tonnes and sewing thread at 500 
tonnes. This acquisition improved the worldwide polyester producer ranking of Yizheng from 
5^ to 4^, in terms of production volume. The consideration of this acquisition was only RMB 
1 for Chinese interest and USD 1 each for foreign interest in joint ventures of FCF. However, 
Yizheng had to guarantee RMB 1.08b debt and agreed to pay RMB 94m for land-use right. 
According to Mr. Ren Chuan-jun^^, the major value created in this acquisition was that 
Yizheng would help FCF to turnaround by rolling over its high-interest debts and controlling 
rising raw material costs by allowing it tojoin long-term supply agreements ofYizheng. 
Unfortunately, FCF reported a loss at least RMB 100m in 1996^^. In 1997 interim report. 
Yizheng reported FCF still incurred a loss but the amount was reduced substantially. 
However, no figure was reported. The major reasons for FCF loss were: 
• FCF had difficulties in adjusting its marketing tactics; 
• FCF had high utility cost; 
• FCF were lack of economies of scale. 
It was typically believed that new acquisition might not bring immediate profit, and 
substantial structural and strategic changes should be implemented in acquired firms. 
However, in the case of FCF acquisition, all the explanations for losses were not convincing 
since such problems existed before acquisition. 
In order to fulfil the requirement of ninth five-year plan, Yizheng management might have 
other options for acquisition. Moreover, if Yizheng found the potential problems in FCF 
acquisition, Yizheng might not guarantee the large amount of loan or negotiate other 
27 Hong Kong Economic Joumal (96/3/28) 
28 South China Moming Post (95/9/1) 
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favourable terms. The failure of FCF acquisition led to the investment public to query the 
management quality of Yizheng. Their behaviour was similar to management in large US 
companies which focus on corporate expansion only but not shareholder value. This is 
another real case to show the potential agency problem in Yizheng. 
III.V. Industry Analysis 
III.V.I. Background of the industry: ^^  
Industry Growth 
Over the past 10 years to the end of 1992, the world production of polyester fibre has grown 
in volume terms at a compound rate of 8.6% per annum. According to the forecast by Tecnon, 
polyester fibre production will grow at a compound rate of 5.3% per annum over the period 
1992-99. 
Product Prices 
The price of polyester in the open market is dependent mainly on the level of demand for 
particular products relative to production capacity and the price of raw materials. There is also 
some variation in the price of polyester as between the major regional markets — North 
America, Europe and the Far East. 
Polyester industry in The PRC 
The textile industry is a major sector in the PRC economy, accounting for 10.5% of the GDP 
in 1992. The textile industry is important in meeting both domestic consumption requirements 
and for exports. With only 0.081 hectares per capita, the PRC has one of the lowest per capita 
ratios of arable land in the world. The PRC Government has policy to encourage utilizing 
available land for food production rather than other types of agricultural products, for 
29 Hong Kong Economic Journal (97/4/22) 
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example, cotton. Therefore, polyester industry has a key role in sustaining The PRC textile 
output. 
Synthetic fibre production in the PRC grew from 314,000 tonnes in 1980 to 1,778,000 tonnes 
in 1992. Out of these totals, polyester fibre has grown to be the most significant synthetic 
fibre, increasing from 37.7% of the PRC total synthetic fibre production in 1980 to 76.8% in 
1992. 
According to Tecnon, polyester fibre production in The PRC (including fibre production from 
imported chip) is projected to grow at a compound rate of 5.6% over the period 1992-99. The 
PRC had a 13.6% world market share of polyester fibre production in 1992. However, the 
PRC polyester industry produces mainly commodity products, e.g. filament, staple fibre. 
In the demand side, the consumption of polyester fibre in the PRC will increase at a 
compound rate of 4.4% per annum over the period 1992-99. Domestic production will 
increase 84.8% oftotal consumption in 1992 to 92.9% in 1999. 
In terms of raw material supply, the PRC consumption of the two major materials (PTA and 
MEG) for polyester production substantially exceeded the amount produced domestically in 
1992 by 43% for PTA and by 65% for MEG. Under the forecast ofTecnon. the rate ofunder 
production will be decreased in the future. However, The PRC will heavily depend on the 
imported petrochemical intermediates to sustain its polyester industry. 
Price Regulation 
Until the end of 1992, a control price for polyester fibre products sold by Chinese producers 
in the PRC was set by the Commodities Price Bureau in consultation with the Textile 
Ministry for each calendar year. From 1993, this price setting procedure was reformed and the 
price of polyester staple fibre was deregulated, whilst that for polyester chip was based on a 
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set median control price around which producers could adjust up or down within a range of 
10% for standard products. From the beginning of 1994, the prices of polyester chip and 
staple fibre may be determined by the producers themselves. 
III.V.II. Porter Five's Forces Analysis - Polyester industry in the PRC 
Rivalry Determinants 
Polyester industry in the PRC is a commodity market. The key products are Polyester chips, 
filament and staple fibres, and can be produced by many companies where the main 
difference is the quality of products. Therefore, the switching cost of customers is really low. 
Companies in the industry will usually sign long-term contract with customers. For instance, 
in 1992, approximately 56% of Yizheng sales are made through long-term contracts, typically 
5-year contracts. Under such contract, customers need to commit a certain volume of 
purchase with quarterly adjusted market price. 
In the PRC polyester fibre market, competitors are mainly regional because of the high 
transportation cost. The following are the key regional competitors: 
Table 14 - Leading polyester producers by 1993 production capacity^" 
World Rank Name Country/Area ('000) tonnes 
4 Nan Ya Taiwan 6 ^ 
5 Yizheng P ^ 540 
6 Hualon Taiwan ^ 
7 Teijin Japan A ^ 
8 Toray Japan 447 
20 Far Eastern Textile Taiwan 4 ^ 
T o ^ 2,940 
Source: Yizheng 94 H-shares listing prospectus 
30 Tecnon estimates in 1993，except figures for Yizheng 
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Moreover, overseas players can usually dump their products into the PRC by charging a much 
lower price than the domestic price of their home countries, for example, Taiwan and South 
Korea. The overseas competition would be much intensive in coastal areas in where the 
transportation cost of imported products is lower. 
Entry Barriers Determinants 
Huge capital requirements would be the greatest entry barriers to polyester industry all over 
the world. For instance, in 1996, the net assets value of Yizheng Chemical was RMB 8.17b 
for producing 746,000 tonnes of polyester fibre. 
The most feasible way to enter this industry is to export the products with the production 
plants located near the PRC. However, the Government increases the entry barrier of the 
market by imposing imported tariff on polyester fibre products. 
Substitute Determinants 
Key polyester fibre products - polyester chips and staple fibre are actually substituted 
products for natural fibres, for example, cotton. Customers can easily switch to choose 
between polyester fibres and cotton. However, as mentioned above, the PRC Government 
principally encourages growing more food than other agriculture products. To textile industry 
in the PRC, polyester fibre products are always good substituted products for cotton. 
Therefore, the demand for polyester fibre would be highly subject to the supply and prices of 
cotton. 
Buver Power Determinants 
Most buyers are individual textile companies, and buy the products directly or through 
wholesalers. For example, in Yizheng prospectus, the company generally sells polyester chip 
directly to end-users and sells polyester staple fibre to wholesalers of textile raw materials in 
each province. In 1992, the company had around 250 regular customers. The largest single 
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customer for polyester chip and staple fibre accounted for 5.7% of production volume only. 
Moreover, the ten largest customers accounted for 33.4% and 28.5% of total sales volume of 
polyester chips and staple fibre respectively. Therefore, individual buyers do not have 
substantial negotiation power to the companies. 
Polyester fibre products are close to commodity and the switching cost of customers is low. 
Bargaining power of customers come from the aggregate demand of the textile industry. The 
1996 annual report of Yizheng stated that owing to the decrease in domestic textile 
consumption and export, the demand for textile products, including polyester fibre, decreased 
substantially. 
Supplier Power Determinants 
The key raw materials in polyester industry are Purified Terephthalic Acid (usually called 
PTA), an organic acid, and MonoEthylene Glycol (usually called MEG), an organic alcohol. 
Both PTA and MEG are petrochemical derivatives. From Yizheng listing prospectus, it 
utilizes approximately 0.864 tonnes of PTA and 0.341 tonnes of MEG to produce one tonne 
of polyester polymer. 
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Source: Yizheng 94 H-shares listing prospectus 
In order to ensure stable and quality supply of raw materials, polyester producers usually 
engage into a limited number of key suppliers only. Comparing the bargaining power of 
buyers, suppliers in general have a higher bargaining power. However, since PTA and MEG 
are also commodity-like products, prices of these two products are also subject to that in the 
open market. 
Conclusion 
Since products and raw materials in polyester industry are commodity-like products, 
producers are still suffered from the cyclical nature of commodity. Owing to the mismatch 
timing of the demand and supply, prices of polyester fibre and raw materials, and profit 
margin of producers will fluctuate periodically. As companies seem to be difficult to 
differentiate itself from competitors, industry should be one o f the most substantial factors to 
affect the profitability of companies. 
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III.VI. Strategy 
We can understand the principle corporate strategy of Yizheng from the aim stated in 1994 
Annual Report: 
"Our aim is to enhance Yizheng's status as an international producer of polyester products 
and raw materials, by enlarging production, developing new products, strengthening 
ancillary facilities and pursuing well-considered expansion plans." 
As polyester products are commodity-like products, players in that market are subject to the 
aggregate demand and supply of the products and do not have a large bargaining power in the 
pricing. Therefore, in order to increase their profits, producers have two choices: 
1. Increasing production volume of products; 
2. Developing new products to fit the needs of new market segments. 
In polyester industry, both strategies require companies to invest a large amount of capital to 
establish new production facilities. 
Therefore, in its annual report, Yizheng establishes itself mainly as a polyester producer and 
set up the strategies to increase its production and diversify its product mix to increase the 
profits. At the end, Yizheng expects to increase its profit and achieve economies of scale by 
increasing its production volume. 
Table 15 listed the 3 development phases ofYizheng - increase in the production capacity and 
diversification of production mix. Meanwhile, Yizheng had also done rescarch and 
development to improve the efficiencies and productivity of the machinery. 
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Table 15 - Production Facilities and Capacities of Yizheng 
Phase I 
Production line Prod. Date Rated Capacity (tonnes) 
Plant No. 1 1 line: Polyester chips 12/84 63,000 
2 lines: Staple fibre 5/84-2/87 120,000 
Phase II 
Production line Prod. Date Rated Capacity (tonnes) 
Plant No. 2 1 line: Polyester chips 07/88 63,000 
2 lines: Staple fibre 09/87-01/90 120,000 
Plant No. 3 2 lines: Polyester chips 12/89-10/90 126,000 
Plant No. 4 1 line: Hollow fibre 04/90 4,000 
1 line: Differential chips 10/93 4,000 
1 line: Spinning Finishes 10/93 1,800 
Phase III 
Production line Prod. Date Rated Capacity (tonnes) 
Plant No. 5 1 line: Filament 5 m 20,000 
PTA plant 1 line: PTA o m 250,000 
Plant No. 3 1 line: Polyester chips 9/95 60,000 
(expansion 
J 
Phase Investment Amount (RMB b) Construction Period 
J L 1982-87 
J ^ 8 1985-90 
III 2IJ_ 1990-95 
Source: Yizheng 94 H-shares listing prospectus and annual reports 
Strategies Review 
Under our analysis, there are two major problems behind Yizheng's strategy: 
• Lack of diversification in product portfolio; 
• Lack of diversification in geographical market. 
Lack of diversification in product portfolio 
In order to review the overall performance of Yizheng, we have tried to find comparable 
companies for comparison. Among all H-share companies, there is no directly comparable 
polyester manufacturer. On the other hand, we have chosen two large-scale petrochemical H-
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share companies for comparison - Jilin Chemical (SEHK Code No.: 368) and Shanghai 
Petrochemical (SEHK Code No.: 338). We have used the ratio analysis method for 
comparison. 
Table 16 - Breakdown of Return on Equity (ROE) of Jilin Chemical, Shanghai 
Petrochemical and Yizheng Chemical 
Jilin Chemical 1994 1995 1996 
Net Profit Margin 10.30% 10.50% 4.06% 
X Asset Turnover (average) 0.67 0.68 0.56 
=ROA (average) 6.87% 7.10% 2.29% 
X Financial Leverage 2.36 2.33 2.51 
=ROE (average) 16.18% 16.54% 5.75% 
Shanghai Petrochemical 1994 1995 1996 
Net Profit Margin 15.92% 17.97% 8.47% 
X Asset Turnover (average) 0.60 0.72 0.66 
=ROA (average) 9.57% 12.99% 5.62% 
X Financial Leverage ^ m ^_^ 1.62 
=ROE (average) 15.87% 20.95% 9.08% 
Yizheng Chemical 1994 1995 1996 
Net Profit Margin 15.73% 13.04% 3.08% 
X Asset Turnover (average) 0 ^ 0 ^ o . 5 1 
=ROA (average) 12.37% 10.10% 1.57% 
X Financial Leverage ; | ^ v j ^ 1.68 
=RQE (average) 23.03% 17.25% 2.64% 
Source: Yizheng annual reports and Wardlcy Data Serviccs Ltd. 
In Table 16, we can notice that the performance of 3 petrochemical companies following 
similar industry trend in the past few years. Their performances were improved in 1995, 
except Yizheng, but were bad in 1996. One of the reasons was the over supply of 
petrochemical products in Asia. When comparing with that ofother petrochemical companies, 
Yizheng performed the best in 1994, but the worst in 1996. Its earnings were less stable than 
other companies because Yizheng has less diversified products portfolio than others. 
Yizheng mainly focus on four key products (polyester chips, staple fibre, filaments and 
hollow fibre) which targeted textile industries only. Moreover, the production of Yizheng is 
highly concentrated in only two less value-added products - polyester chips and staple fibre. 
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These two products in aggregate accounted for 96% and 92% of total production volume in 
1995 and 1996 respectively. In Figure 8, we can find that the prices of these products changed 
at the same time. 
Figure 8 - Yizheng product prices trend 
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Source: Hong Kong Economic Journal 
Table 17 - The first 3 largest product categories of the 3 petrochemical companies in 
terms of"/o turnover in 1996 
Name of Companies Product Category % of Turnover (1996) 
Jilin Chemical Petroleum products 41.3% 
Petrochemical & organic chemical 22.9% 
products 
Dyestuff & dye intermediates 1 o.6% 
- Total: 74.8% 
Shanghai Petrochemical Resins & Plastics 3 1 . 8 % 
Petroleum Products 24.2% 
Synthetic Fibres 24.1% 
Total: 80.1% 
Yizheng Chemical Synthetic Fibres (include staple 55% 
fibre, filament, hollow fibre) 
Synthetic Fibres materials 42% 
(polyester chips) 
Others 3 � / � 
Total: 100% 
Source: Yizheng annual reports and Wardley Data Services Ltd. 
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According to Ritter (1991)5, investors prefer companies with less fluctuation in earnings. 
Therefore, in the long run, strategies of Yizheng should be able to stabilize the earnings 
growth of the company. From the share price performance, the strategy of Yizheng to 
concentrate in one industry is not appropriate to increase its shareholders value. 
Table 18 - Profit margins of Yizheng 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
Gross Profit Margin 23.32% 25.54% 20.44% 13.02% 
Operating Profit Margin 21.47% 18.52% 14.60% 5.96% 
Net Profit Margin 13.82% 15.73% 13.04% 3.11% 
Source: Yizheng annual reports 
Moreover, in Table 15, we can find that the production capacities ofYizheng increase year by 
year. However, Table 18 shows that Yizheng could not achieve the expected economies of 
scale even in the most favourable year 1995. 
Conclusively, by focusing on two less value-added products, Yizheng cannot achieve the 
expected economies of scale, and its earning is highly affected by the economy of these two 
products. Therefore, in the long run, Yizheng should produce more value-added products for 
various industries. 
Lack of diversification in geographical market 
The key markets of Yizheng are in the coastal area. Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces 
accounted for nearly 50% of sales in 1992. Moreover, the FCF group acquired in 1995 mainly 
focus in Guangdong region. 
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Table 19 - Geographical distribution of sales in the PRC in 1992 (% of sale volume) 








Other areas of the PRC 37.4% 
Exports 2.5% 
100% 
Source: Yizheng 94 H-shares listing prospectus 
Although many textile companies are located in coastal areas, this region is highly 
competitive, and highly affected by the dumping problems of Taiwan and South Korea 
competitors. Moreover, owing to over concentration in certain markets Yizheng would be 
also affected by other specific problems in these areas. 
Therefore, Yizheng is recommended to sell its products to various provinces and cities, and to 
export its products to other countries. In 1996 and 1997, Yizheng established subsidiaries in 
different cities, including Hong Kong. Yizheng has implemented an appropriate distribution 
strategy, but the performance is still subjcct to ftirthcr observation, 
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CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY: HARBIN POWER EQUIPMENT COMPANY LTD. 
IV.I. Background 
Harbin Power Equipment Company Limited ("HPEC") (SEHK code: 1133) is the PRC 
leading manufacturer and exporter of power plant equipment. It was formed through the 
restructuring of Harbin Power Plant Equipment Group Corporation ("HPEGC"), which is the 
oldest large-scale power plant equipment manufacturer in PRC. It is located in Harbin. the 
PRC, known as the "City of Power." As at the end of December 1996, the whole group of 
HPEC employed 26,609 people. 
It provides a wide range of power equipment for both hydro and thermal power plants such as 
boilers, turbines, turbine generators and motors. It also provides engineering service for 
power plants and has a capability to manage a "tum-key project." More than half of revenue 
comes from the sales of main thermal power equipment. 
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Source: HPEC 94 H-share prospectus and annual reports 
31 1991 to 1994 are prepared on combined basis as if the current group structure had been in existence. 
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History 
In 1950s, three works o fHPEGC, Harbin Generator Works, Harbin Boiler Works and Harbin 
Turbine Works, which were predecessors of the Group's three wholly owned subsidiaries, 
were established in Harbin, Heilongjiang Province under the administration of the Ministry of 
Machinery Industry of the PRC. Based on the technology imported from the former Soviet 
Union, HPEGC developed its own technology independently, improved the product quality, 
and expanded their production capacity until 1980s. Under the further technology 
advancement programs in the sixth and seventh Five-Year Plan, they made a 15-year 
technology transfer arrangement with ABB Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse 
Electric Corp in 1981. They have been the largest power equipment manufacturers in the 
PRC. 
Listing 
In December, 1994, HPEC listed its H-shares in the Stock Exchange o f H o n g Kong as the 15^ 
H share company. Its international placement subscribed 10 times and H shares in Hong Kong 
was 1.4 times subscribed. The first trading day was December 16, 1994. The lead manager 
was S.G. Warburg which is SBC Warburg Dillion Read now. HPEC issued 435 million shares 
at RMB 2.84 which was HK$ 2.58 with over-allotment option to S.G. Warburg. Market 
capitalization on March 18, 1998 was HK$ 492.61 million (Bloomberg). 
Table 20 - Share Placement 
MonthriTear Share Capital Changes No. ofShares 
Dec. 1994 Issued @ RMB 2.84 to ABB Asea Brown Boveri 21,600,000 
Placed @ RMB 2.84 internationally 314,400,000 
Offered @ RMB 2.84 to the public in HK 72,000,000 
Jan. 1995 Placed @ RMB 2.84 internationally to cover over- 34,151,000 
allotments 
她丨 469,151,000 
Source: Wardley Data Services Ltd. 
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60.55% shares o f H P E C are owned by HPEGC as A shares and the rest of them are owned by 
international investors including ABB as H shares. HPEC owns 100% interest of the four 
main subsidiaries: Harbin Boiler Co Ltd., Harbin Turbine Co Ltd., Harbin Electric Machinery 
Co Ltd., and Harbin Power Plant Engineering Co Ltd. 
Figure 10 - Ownership Structure o f H P E C 
Harbin Power Plant Equipment 
Group Corp 
Hshs . A shs. 60.55% 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ ^ y r 
Overseas & HK 39 450/� HPEC 
investors 
lOOoZo 100% 100% 100% 
1 i i ^ 
Harbin Boiler Co Harbin Turbine Co Harbin Electric Harbin Power Plant 
Ltd. Ltd. Machinery Co Ltd. Engineering Co Ltd. 
Source: Wardley Data Services Ltd. ~" 
Usage of proceeds of the H share offer were as follows: 
Approximately HK$817 million to HK$930 million would bc uscd for thc construction of 
production facilitics, thc purchasc of equipment, thc development of new products, and the 
improvement of technologies. 
Approximately HK$160 million would be used to reduce the Group's borrowings, and the 
balance of approximately HK$90 million would be used as additional working capital of 
HPEC. 
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32 The share performance index of HPEC has been under 100 most of the time after listing, lt 
reached the highest o fHK$ 3.875 on August 26, 1997, when there was a booming HK market 
after the Hong Kong handover to the PRC. However, the price on January 13, 1998 was only 
25.2% of the price on the first trading day. 
Figure 11 - Relative Share Price Performance ofHPEC (First trading day = 100) 
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Source: Datastream 
IV.II. Agency Cost 
IV.I I . I . Management Structure 
Through the analysis of board members career, some important directors also have positions 
in the PRC Government. For example, Li Gen-shen, chairman of the board of directors of 
HPEC and its group, has the positions in the Government such as deputy director in the State 
Defense Department, deputy secretary of Heilongjiang Party Committee, member of Party 
Central Committee and deputy head of Heilongjian Provincial People's Committee. This 
implies that there is a chance of the conflict between the stand point as chairman and the one 
as Government officer. 
32 Share performance index is the relative price to the one on December 16, 1994 as 100. 
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Table 21 - Previous/Present Government Position of HPEC Directors 
Name Government Position 
Li Gen-shen Deputy director in the State Defence Department 
Deputy Secretary of Heilongjiang Party Committee 
Member of Party Central Committee 
Deputy head of Heilongjian Provincial People's Committee 
Pan Chong-yi Head of Harbin's Light Industry Bureau 
Hong Qi-peng Member of Harbin Municipal People's Congress 
Liang Wei-yan Member of the PRC Society of Electrical Engineering 
Member ofthe PRC Society of Electrical Engineering Technology 
Assistant Director ofthe three Gorges Project Equipment Office under 
the Ministry of Machinery 
Lu Yan-sun Chairman of the PRC Society of Engineering Dynamics of the PRC 
Society of Mechanical Engineering 
Chairman ofthe PRC Association of Power Generation Equipment 
Manufacturing Industry 
Zhang Yi-chen Member of the Harbin Municipal Government Political Consultative 
Committee 
Member ofthe Specialist Consultative Committee ofthe Harbin 
Municipal Government 
Yang Ying-Iiu Member of National People_s Congress 
Executive member of Harbin Municipal Political Consultation Committee 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There is no correlation between the growth of directors' and supervisors' remuneration and 
the earnings growth ofHPEC. Directors' and supervisors' remuneration has increased in last 
two years. On the other hand, EPS growth dramatically decreased in last two years. 
Therefore, HPEC does not have incentive system for management and has more possibility of 
conflict of interest between principal and agent. 
Table 23 — Remuneration & Bonus of management in HPEC (Unit: RMB) 
Directors' fee Other Emoluments Pension Total Growth EPS 
(RMB) (ED&SV)Salariesand Contributions (RMB) Growth 
other benefits (RMB) (RMB) 
1994 270,000 81,000 53,000 404,000 
1995 271,000 91,000 54,000 416,000 3.0% -56.9% 
1996 321,000 101,000 37,000 459,000 10.3% -31.1% 
Source: HPEC annual reports 
IV.II.III. Management Ownership 
According to annual reports, none of the directors or supervisors had any interest in any 
shares or debentures of the HPEC or any of its associated companies. This may cause less 
incentive for directors to increase EPS and shareholders value. 
IV.III. Government Regulation 
IV.III.I. Product and Raw Material Price 
The PRC Government still has power on the industry in several kinds of way. The power 
equipment industry is a protected industry from foreign competitors. The Government 
prohibits 100% foreign-owned companies at this moment. Obviously, a restricted competition 
exists in this industry. According to the prospectus, there is also a price regulation. HPEC 
needs an approval from the State Price Control Bureau in order to increase their product price. 
HPEC also has "Price compensation" upon approval by the State Price Control Bureau 
(SPCB). The amount of price compensation is determined by the increase of the costs of 
producing the goods sold due to the changes in the PRC Government policies. It is also 
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necessary for HPEC to have an approval for production capacity expansion. It seems that 
HPEC's profitability and fUture growth are significantly affected by the PRC Government. 
IV.III.II. Taxation 
HPEC taxable income is subject to an income tax rate of 15% pursuant to the Notice on 
Certain Preferential Income Tax Policies issued by the PRC Ministry of Finance and the State 
Tax Bureau on March 29, 1994. According to the Provisional Regulations of the People's 
Republic of China concerning Income Tax on Enterprises, all joint stock enterprises are 
required to pay enterprise income tax at the rate of 33 % unless they are exempted or 
alleviated by other regulation. Therefore, 18 % of HPEC profit depends on the Government 
policy. 
IV.III.III. Monetary Policy 
The Government can affect the industry in an indirect way such as monetary policy, because 
interest rate and money supply are related with the huge investment in power plants. After the 
Government austerity program, credit crunch from 1993 delayed the development of power 
plants. This was coincided with a decline in World and Asian Development Bank soft loans to 
the PRC power industry. These things resulted in the decrease of the tumover of HPEC. The 
following analysis suggests the negative correlation between interest rate and power 
equipment industry. We analyzed the data of annual capacity increase and three-year loan 
interest rate. Because it takes 18 to 30 months to finish building power equipment, the interest 
rate is shifted for 3 years forward. In the following graph, it is observed that the decrcase of 
interest in 1991 and 1992 affected the increase of annual capacity addition in 1994, 1995 and 
1996. 
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Figure 12 - Capacity Addition and Interest Rate 
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In 1996, the PRC Government intended to utilize part of foreign exchange reserve to purchase 
power-generating facilities manufactured in the PRC for establishing power generating 
stations. This new measure will secure the availability of funds for the construction of power 
generating stations and for the procurement of power generating equipment. This results in 
the development of the power equipment industry. 
The Government can even have a power on the projects abroad, because it can give a 
conditional Government loan to foreign projects. For example, the PRC granted a $180 
million suppliers' credit to Philippines' Magellan Utilities Development Corp for the contract 
with the PRC Shanghai Electric Corp in November 1996. 
The Government has to protect its people's interest. In other words, the Government does not 
want to increase electricity price. Higher power equipment cost will affect the initial 
investment of power plant, which causes higher electricity price. Therefore, there is a 
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possibility that the interests of company and Government are different from each other. And 
the Government still controls the industry in many ways. 
IV.IV. Asymmetric Information 
IV.IV.I. Analyst Coverage 
Equity analysts play a role to decrease the information gap between directors and outside 
investors. The analysts who cover HPEC are 18 professionals from 16 investment banks 
according to Bloomberg. No US-base investment bank analyst is on the list of the HPEC 
analyst coverage. 
IV.IV.II. Investment of Institutional Investors 
HPEC made a special placement o f21 .6 million H shares to ABB in December, 1994. This is 
positive information to investors because they may have a confidence on the company. This 
may also decrease asymmetric information because the institutional investors can access to 
more information. 
Table 24 - Strategic Investors o f H P E C 
Investor No. of shares owned % of H shares 
in December, 1994 (m) 
Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) 21.6 4.6% 
Table 25 - List ofPrincipal Subsidiaries & Associated Companies 
Name Group's interest Activity 
Harbin BoilerCo. Ltd. 100% Manufacturing of boilers 
Harbin Electrical Machinery Co. 100% Mfg of stream turbine generators 
Ltd. sets & hydro turbine generator sets 
Harbin Power Engineering Co. 100% Provision of engineering services for 
Ltd. power stations 
Harbin Turbine Co. Ltd. 100% Manufacturing of stream turbines 
Harbin Power Technology 100% Trading 
Trading Co. Ltd. 
Harbin Power Property 100% Property development 
Development Co. Ltd. 
Source: Wardley Data Services Ltd. 
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IV.IV.III. Information disclosure 
HPEC releases its annual reports and interim every year. HPEC does not clearly state the 
reason why HPEC set up a property development subsidiary, which are fully owned by 
HPEC, in the section of "Overview of the company" and "Management Discussion and 
Analysis" of its annual report. The following is the list of principal subsidiaries and associated 
companies. Even though they put this list in "Notes to the Financial Statements," only first 
four companies are stated clearly in the sections above, which may get more attentions. It 
may be difficult for investors to understand the reason that HPEC has a property development 
company as a subsidiary. 
IV.V. Industry 
IV.V.I. Industry Growth 
Power equipment industry has developed very fast at around 10% annual growth during late 
1980s and early 1990s. Electricity supply was one of important factor to sustain high 
economic growth, so PRC Government has committed to the development of power plants in 
a long run. The PRC is also a developing country in terms of per capita electricity 
consumption. Per capita electricity consumption of PRC in 1992 was 631 KWh, which was 
only one-eleventh of Japan�� . Obviously this industry has a lot of potential for substantial 
future development. 
However, the industry growth became lower after 1994 because o f t h e PRC austerity policy 
stating from 1993. Because of the policy, most of the PRC companies had a problem in 
financing. For example, interest rate of one to three year loan went up to 12.24% from 9% in 
July, 1993. Projects of establishing power generators were also affected. Companies had to 
postpone or scale down their projects. This resulted in the slow growth of power equipment 
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companies. The installed capacity increase in 1997 was 5.7%, which is less than half of the 
highest growth of 12.2% in 1988. 
Figure 13 - Annual Increase of Electricity Demand & Supply 
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Source: China Statistics Yearbook 
IV.V.II. Porter Five's Forces Analysis - Power Equipment Industry in the PRC 
Rivalry Determinant 
The threat from competitors is not significant because the power equipment industry is a 
regulated industry in which a fully foreign-owned company is prohibited. Although foreign 
companies can export their products, they are approved case by case and are charged tariffs, 
too. 
Major domestic competitors are Dongfang Electric Machinery, which is also H-share 
company, and Shanghai Electric Corporation which is planning to list in Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. These three companies together accounted for over 73% oftotal hydro and thermal 
power plant equipment production in the PRC in 1993, one year before HPEC listing. 
Dongfang provides the equipment for both hydro power plants, which contributes around 
“HPEC 94 H-share listing prospectus 
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20% of electricity generation in PRC, and thermal equipment. HPEC has the largest 
production capacity both hydro and thermal power equipment. Shanghai sells only thermal 
power equipment. 
Figure 14 - Comparison of Designed Production Capacity in 1993 
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Source: HEPC 94 H-share listing prospectus 
From the data of electricity generation, thermal power plants account for about 80% which 
means thermal power equipment industry is larger markets than hydro power equipment. 
Therefore, HPEC has a better position in the industry. 
Entry Barriers Determinant 
There is small possibility to have threat from new entrants at this moment. The power 
equipment industry is a protected and high entry-barrier industry. The entry barriers are 
observed to be the Government regulation, large initial investment, and technology 
requirement. Foreign companies can only enter this industry by forming joint ventures with 
PRC partners. Not many PRC companies can afford to invest large amount money and to 
have such high technology. 
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Table 26 - Total Energy Available for Consumption (Billion kWh) 
Electricity Generation Share 
Total Hydro Thermal Nuclear Hydro Thermal Nuclear 
1980 300.63 58.21 242.42 19.4% 80.6% 0.0% 
198 5 410.69 92.37 318.32 22.5% 77.5% 0.0% 
198 6 449.53 94.53 355 21.0% 79.0% 0.0% 
198 7 497.27 100.01 397.26 20.1% 79.9% 0.0% 
198 8 545.21 109.15 436.06 20.0% 80.0% 0.0% 
198 9 584.81 118.39 466.42 20.2% 79.8% 0.0% 
199 0 621.2 126.72 494.48 20.4% 79.6% 0.0% 
199 1 677.55 125.09 552.46 18.5% 81.5% 0.0% 
199 2 753.94 132.47 621.47 17.6% 82.4% 0.0% 
199 3 838.26 154.38 683.88 18.4% 81.6% 0.0% 
199 4 928.08 182.16 745.92 19.6% 80.4% 0.0% 
199 5 1007.73 190.58 804.32 12.83 18.9% 79.8% 1.3% 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 
Substitute Determinant 
Nuclear Power Equipment will be the only major possible substitute at this moment. In the 
Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000), the PRC planned to expand its nuclear power program 
rapidly, through imports of foreign equipment and technology as well as increased reliance on 
domestic power equipment�*. Most probably nuclear generators will have a threat to this 
company in a long run. The PRC has difficulty to find the ftinds to pay for the nuclear plants, 
so foreign providers may come with more attractive financing packages. In developed 
countries, nuclear power is an important and non-polluted energy source. Because 
environmental issue is serious in the PRC, Government must seriously consider the potential 
of nuclear power plants. Therefore, threat from new technology and more competitive foreign 
companies will be high to HPEC. 
Buyer Power Determinant 
34 Richard P. Suttmeier and Peter C. Evans, "China Goes Nuclear", The China Business Review 
(September-October, 1996) 
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There are two main types of buyers: domestic and foreign buyers, which are mainly power 
generators. Other customers include petrochemical and metallurgical companies. Foreign 
buyers are mainly from the developing countries, which have more potential of power plants 
development. HPEC had contracts in Pakistan, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam, Albania, Congo, 
Canada, US, Turkey, Venezuela, Malaysia, and Iran before. In these countries, HPEC has to 
compete with international players. Buyers must have more power in this situation because 
there are more power equipment companies than buyers. 
Because of Government control in the PRC domestic market, there is little negotiation 
between buyers and HPEC. HPEC has “Price compensation" upon approval by the State Price 
Control Bureau ("SPCB"). The amount of price compensation is determined by the increase 
of the costs of producing the goods sold due to the changes in the PRC Government policies. 
The amount of price compensation was RMB 158.325 million in 1995 and RMB 89.788 
million in 1996, which were 6.48% and 4.31% of total turnover respectively. More 
surprisingly, the HPEC group profit was RMB 122.087 million in 1995 and RMB 84.532 
million in 1996. Price compensation was more than HPEC profit obviously. 
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Supplier Power Determinant 
Suppliers for the power equipment industry are mainly steel manufacturers and technology 
partners. According to HPEC's prospectus, 45 - 51% of total raw material consumption is 
steel, so steel manufacturers are important suppliers to HPEC. Because domestic steel 
demand exceeds its supply, a shortage of supply may affect the production of HPEC. HPEC 
group's requirement was guaranteed under State Plans in 1994. However, there is no certainty 
that the extent of such guarantee would be maintained every year. HPEC also relies on 
imported raw materials. About 30% of raw materials are imported through China Metal & 
Minerals Import & Export Corporation. Therefore, under the present PRC system, HPEC 
enjoys high profitability under the Government favorable policy. 
ABB Combustion Engineering (ABBCE) and Westinghouse Electric Corporation Limited 
(WEC) are the technology partners. ABBCE provides the technology about thermal power 
equipment and WEC gives the one for hydropower equipment. Technology partners may not 
have much threat because many foreign companies want to form a partnership with PRC 
companies in order to obtain a stake of PRC infrastructure development. ABBCE obtained 
21.6 million H shares which was 4.6% of total H share issue. 
Conclusion 
As a conclusion, HPEC does not have much threat from these five forces because there is not 
serious competition in PRC domestic market. PRC power equipment industry is oligopolistic. 
There is a government control in both buyer side and supplier side. In the long run the threat 
from substitute will be larger because the thermal and hydro power equipment market will 
decrease. In terms o f n e w entrants, this really depends on the Government regulation to allow 
foreign companies to enter PRC markets. On the other hand, the international market is very 
different from the domestic market. In the international market, HPEC has to compete with 
35 1994 figure was prepared by S.G. Warburg 
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international players from US, Japan and Europe. In these markets, HPEC profit margin will 
be same as international standard or even lower than it because it has to compete with more 
advanced-technology competitors. 
IV.VI. Strategy 
HEPC strategy is "Diversification" compared with its key competitor Dongfang Electrical 
Machinery Company Limited ("DEMC") (SEHK Code: 1072). HEPC provides wider range 
of products and services. DEMC focuses on hydropower equipment and manufactures only 
steam turbine generators in thermal power equipment. It does not provide engineering 
services, which is lower profitability than other products. 
Figure 16 - Comparison ofBusiness Portfolio (1996 data)^^ 
~~3 ,000 ,000 I 2’402，817 " ^ 
2,500,000 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
一 2,000,000 I 9 9 
S 1,500,000… 丨丨-1丨1丨丨1丨丨1丨1丨丨1丨丨1丨丨1丨1丨_1 
^ H 
1,000,000 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 647,192 
500,000 ^ ^ ^ ^ H 丨_丨_丨"丨‘…丨丨丨“丨“丨丨丨丨丨丨…丨丨丨丨丨丨丨丨_丨丨i 
H H , L H H L _ _ J 
HPEC DEMC 
• Thermal pow er equipment *1 • Hydro pow er equipment 
_ Other products (A.C. & D.C. motors etc.) • Engineering service 
Source: HPEC Annual reports 
HPEC，s profitability is more than 20 % in thermal and hydropower equipment, however the 
profitability of engineering service is only 13.5 %. DEMC profitability is higher than HPEC 
even though it made loss in other products such as AC and DC motors. This implies that 
36 DEMC manufactures steam turbine generators only. 
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DEMC concentrates only the profitable products, on the other hand, HPEC provides full 
range products and services. 
In terms of strategic focuses, HPEC mainly focuses on the following three areas: international 
business development, R&D enhancement, and quality control. Because the PRC domestic 
market has been unfavorable, HPEC has put more effort on the development of foreign 
markets in Southeast Asia and Middle East developing countries. With cooperation of the 
PRC Government, HPEC successfully developed international clients and the turnover from 
abroad accounts for around 15.7% in 1996. This strategy has been taken by DEMC, too. 
DEMC's marketing mission is "Developing both domestic and overseas markets and markets 
of different scales and not overlooking repairs and maintenance."^^ 
Table 27 - Comparison of Operating Profit Margin (1996 data) 
HPEC DEMC 
Thermal power equipment 24.9% 51.2% 
Hydro power equipment 20.0% 27.0% 
Other products (A.C. & D.C. motors etc.) 28.5% -8.0% 
Engineering service 13.5% 
Total 23.70/0 31.2% 
Source: HPEC annual reports 
About technology alliance, HPEC signed a technology transfer agreement with ABBCE and 
Westinghouse Electric Corp Ltd. in 1980s. This strategic alliance does not really differentiate 
HPEC from other competitors. DEMC also teamed up with Hitachi to manufacture steam 
turbine generators. Through its internal operational review, HPEC tries to upgrade product 
quality and professional project management. It has committed in quality control because it is 
one of the important criteria to win contracts. In fact, it has already obtained ISO 9001 
standards which guaranteed its level of quality internationally. 
37 DEMC annual reports 
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The result o f the i r strategic difference obviously appears in Retum on Equity (ROE). DEMC 
enjoys higher ROE as a result of higher net profit margin, although financial leverage of 
HPEC is higher than that of DEMC. In terms of profitability, HPEC strategy is not regarded 
as better strategy than that of DEMC. 
Table 28 - Comparison of ROE Decomposition 
HPEC DEMC 
1995 1996 1995 1996 
ROE (%) 4.50/0 3.0% 8.6% 4.8% 
Net profit margin (%) 4.6% 3.5% 15.3% 8.8% 
Asset turnover (X) 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.33 
Financial leverage (X) 2.88 2.78 1.68 1.69 
Source: HPEC and DEMC annual reports 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
By comparing the two cases of Yizheng and HPEC, we find some notable difference, which 
may possibly affect their share price performance. We will compare both companies in terms 
of the criteria such as agency cost. Government control, asymmetric information, industry and 
strategy. 
V.I. Agency Cost 
The three elements in agency cost are management structure, remuneration and management 
ownership. In both companies, the chairman of the board has an important position of 
government entities. They do not have Hong Kong resident non-executive directors. 
Concerning remuneration, increase of bonus and salary is not correlated with the increase of 
earnings per share ("EPS"). Although EPS growth in both companies were negative in last 
two years, the directors' remuneration continued to be increased. These two evidence are very 
important because these may cause the conflict of interest between principals and agency. 
However, these are not the difference between two the best and worst performing companies. 
Management ownership ofYizheng is different from that ofHPEC. Even though management 
ownership of Yizheng directors is small, they have a stake of Yizheng. On the other hand, 
none of the directors or supervisors has any interest in any shares or debentures of the HPEC 
or any of its associated companies. Therefore, incentive system by share ownership should be 
considered as a factor to increase share price performance. 
V.ll. Government Control 
The PRC Government control polyester and power equipment industries in many ways such 
as price control, taxation, import custom, money supply, business diversification, financing 
and, decisions on mergers and acquisitions. 
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Price control is stronger in power equipment industry than polyester industry because of the 
deregulation of raw material price and polyester fibre price. We believe that higher power 
equipment cost highly affects the initial investment of power plant which causes higher 
electricity price. Power equipment industry is more related to the infrastructure of the 
economy and thus more Government controls to protect the residents' interest rather than the 
shareholders' interest. On the other hand, there is an evidence that the Government can affect 
polyester fibre price indirectly through import tariff, taxation etc. 
In terms of financing, Yizheng H-share price decreased after the announcement of new 
issuance of H-share on March 16, 1995 instead of A-shares. The Government influence on 
this matter was reasoned to protect the domestic market and to ignore H-share investors' price 
risk caused by sudden increase in the supply ofH-shares. 
As a conclusion, the Government has been affecting both industries directly and indirectly for 
the national interest. The extent of government control is identical in both industries. 
V.lll. Asymmetric Information 
There is no obvious difference of information disclosure between two companies. Both 
companies have to follow the regulation both in Hong Kong and in the PRC. We find HPEC 
hesitance to disclose its property development subsidiary. Managing director ofYizheng also 
tried to hide a bad news about the drop of profit margin. The hidden action problem (Hillicr 
(1997)) is observed in both Yizheng and HPEC. 
Analyst coverage, which decreases the information gap between directors and outside 
investors, is significantly different. Only 18 analysts from 16 investment banks cover HPEC, 
while 35 analysts from 25 investment banks cover Yizheng. We can expect that the 
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information of Yizheng is more available than HPEC that obtains more confidence from 
investors. 
V.IV. Industry 
Power equipment industry is more protected and less pressure from five forces than polyester 
industry. HPEC profitability is more secured by the Government. In the other words, it is 
easily controlled by the PRC Government. HPEC financial result has been heavily affected by 
the Government austerity program in the last three years. On the other hand, the pressure from 
rivalry in the industry is largest in the five forces because the polyester market has no price 
control. The polyester fibre price is determined by the aggregate demand and supply of the 
market. When Yizheng was listed in 1994, the industry was in upward trend. Then, Yizheng 
share performance was good in the first year. As a conclusion, we regard industry growth is 
an important factor of share price performance. 
V.V. Strategy 
Strategy is a significant factor to decide whether the company can outperform the other 
competitors in the industry. After our evaluation, we conclude that HPEC strategy is not 
competitive enough when comparing with the other competitor, DEMC On the other hand, 
Yizheng has not had a diversified product portfolio. Although it outperformed the competitors 
in terms o f R O E in 1994 because the industry was in the uptrend, Yizheng underperformed its 
competitors when the industry was going down. 
V.VI. Explanations for the first year price performance of Yizheng and HPEC 
Figure 17 shows the general trend of V' year share price performance of Yizheng. We can 
analyze the price changes into 3 phases; 
• After listing, the share price ofYizheng generally moved in line with Hang Seng Chinese 
Enterprise Index. It meant that the market expected Yizheng should perform in line with 
other H-share companies. 
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• On August 25, 1994, Yizheng announced its 1994 interim result, which was 2.8 times 
better than that in similar period in 1993. This good result was out of the expectation of 
the market and mainly due to the large decrease of exchange loss and the actual 
production volume greater than the rated capacity. Then the share price increased 32% 
within less than one month where the market only increased by 5.6%. 
• Afterwards, the share price of Yizheng moved in line with the market but outperformed 
the Hang Seng Chinese Enterprise Index (Table 29). This was mainly due to the expected 
shortage of cotton in the PRC. Since Yizheng mainly produced polyester fibre, the 
expected higher fibre price should increase the revenue ofYizheng. 
Figure 1 7 - 250 trading days share price performance ofYizheng 
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Table 29 - Yizheng Share price on 9/15/94 and 3/14/95^* 
Date Yizheng Hang Seng Index Hang Seng China 
Enterprise Index 
15/9/94 ^ 9862.64 1492.51 
14/3/95 ^ 8094.58 949.34 
38 9/15/94 - Highest price after 1994 interim result; 3/14/95 - the last day of250 time frame 
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Change (%) 17.59% 17.93% 36.39% 
Source: Datastream 
Figure 18 shows the 1" year price trend of HPEC after its H-shares listing at the end of 1994. 
The analysis can be divided into 3 stages: 
• After listing, the share price of HPEC moved in-line with Hang Seng Chinese Enterprise 
Index. However, both the lines were well below that of Hang Seng Index because the 
market worried about the adverse impact of austerity programme of the PRC on those H-
share companies. 
• From the highest point of the share price of HPEC on August 4, 95, the share price 
dropped continuously to at most 30%. It was out of the expectation of the market, and was 
mainly due to the drop of the 1995 interim earnings comparing with that in last year, 
without previous warnings from the management. While within the same period, revenues 
of competitor - DFEM was also dropped by 26%. (Table 30) 
• In the late 1995, as the austerity programme o f t h e PRC proceeded, both the share price of 
HPEC and Hang Seng Chinese Enterprise Index dropped. HPEC share price performed 
worse than the benchmark index because of the revised whole year earnings forecast by 
equity analysts. 
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Figure 18 - 250 trading days share price performance o f H P E C 
(Relative value on the first trading day = 100) 
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HPEC Hang Seng Index Hang Seng China Enterpr ise Index 
Source: Dalastreain 
Table 30 - HPEC share price on 4/8/95 and 30/8/95^^ 
Date Yizheng Hang Seng Index Hang Seng China 
Enterprise index 
4/8/95 2.63 9362.83 1075.45 
30/8/95 1.83 9197.21 927.49 
Change (%) -30.42% -1.77% -13.76% 
Source: Datastream 
From above analysis, we can conclude that in their first trading years, the share prices of these 
two H-share companies were heavily affected by their corresponding industries and specific 
strategies. Moreover, from Figure 19, we could find that the share price of both companies 
were affected by austerity programme (Government intervention) and were dropped until the 
last day of our time frame. Even though the 1995 interim earnings of Yizheng increased 82% 
from that in 1994, its share price also dropped in line with Hang Seng Chinese Enterprise 
Index. However, as these two companies are in different industries, their share price 
performances were different. 
39 4/8/95 — highest price after listing; 30/8/95 - lowest price after 1995 interim result announcement 
72 
Figure 19 一 Comparison performance ofYizheng and HPEC^" 
(Relative value on the last trading day in this time frame = 100) 
230 n 
210 
190 - ^ j s y ^ - v A 
E:V^<-0k^ 
9 。 " ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ " " ^ ^ ^ " " " ^ " " ^ ^ " ^ " V y r ^ y W " " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " ^ " " ^ " ^ 
寸 寸 寸 寸 寸 寸 寸 寸 寸 寸 LD io in ui LD in in in u^  in 
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Yizheng HPEC « ~ H a n g Seng Index 
Source: Datastream 
V.VII. Conclusion 
After comparing the 'best ' and the ‘worst’ performing H-share companies, we find the 
following factors affecting the share price performance the most: 
• Incentive system - ownership structure 
• Analyst coverage 
• Industry 
• Strategy 
Most SOEs in the PRC have a problem in its incentive system. Directors are not really 
motivated to increase profits of the companies because their emolument is not linked with the 
performance o f t h e companies. As a result, the shareholder values of these companies are also 
affected. Therefore, H share companies are encouraged to upgrade their incentive system of 
40 If the share price is higher than the last trading day, it means that the share price is dropping. 
73 
directors by means of stock ownership by directors, EPS linked bonus, and stock option 
although there is still legal problems to complete the system. 
Equity analysts play an important role of information disclosure in H-share companics 
because the information of PRC companies and the PRC market is less attainable. In the short 
run, the H share companies cannot control whether brokerage houses cover them or not. 
However, the companies can decrease asymmetric information problem by enhancing 
investors' relations. They can have investors' relation department, hold more analysts 
meetings, publish monthly journal for investors, etc. 
Industry and strategy factor for H-share companies together are as important as for companies 
in other foreign markets because these are the basic elements in equity valuation. Industry 
factor is hard to be controlled by the companies. Strategic recommendation should be 
different from company to company. The most feasible recommendation to H share 
companies is a diversification of business portfolio in order to reduce industry risk. 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix I I I - History of Yizheng Chemical 
Year Event 
1981 Yizheng Joint Corp of Chemical Fibre Industry ("YJC"), 70% owned by the Ministry 
of Textile (presently called "Textile Council") and 30% owned by China 
International Trust & Investment Corporation ("CITIC") was established in 
Decemberto fund the project to meet the demand of natural fibres for its domestic 
textile industries. 
1982 Phase II commenced to increase production capacity 
1993 Phase III commenced to expand its chip production capacity and to vertically 
integrate into producing PTA (a principally raw material for polyester production) & 
polyester filament. 
Yizheng was established as a Joint Stock Company on December 31, 1993. 
1994 One billion H-shares were issued in March 1994 and listed on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong on March 29, 1994. 
1995 Issued 200m new A-shares in January and traded in the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange on April 11，1995. 
Issued 400m new H-shares in April and traded in the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong on April 26, 1995. 
On August 25’ 1995, acquire Foshan Chemical Fibre Joint Corp (5^ ^ largest 
producer of polyester products in the PRC) and its related companies. 
1996 Obtain approval for its Phase IV expansion proposal, which includes a PTA 
project, a polyester project, a melt spinning staple fibre project and a polyester 
filament project. 
Established subsidiaries in 12 strategically located cities in the PRC to expand its 
sales network and export facilities. 
1997 (97/6/30) Established new subsidiary in Hong Kong to increase its export. 
(97/8/21) State Council approved the merger of Yizheng group (Key product: 
Polyester), Yangzi Petrochemical (Oil refining & midstream products: PTA, PX), 
Jin ling Petrochemical (Oil refining & oil product) & Nanjing Chemical (inorganic 
chemicals). The mergerwould reduce over-expansion of different companies, 
increase the financing advantage, stabilize the raw materials supply and price, 
and might reduce over-employment. 
1998 On March 17, 1998’ State Council announced to approve amended Phase IV 
Plan: 
New production unit: 90,000 tonnes filament annually; 
New production unit: 90,000 tonnes staple fibre annually; 
Technological improvement in existing PTA production: from 250,000 to 350,000 
tonnes annually and existing 7 polyester production units to 200,000 tonnes 
annually; 
Establish local polyester production unit: annual production 100,000 tonnes; 
New production unit: 450,000 tonnes PTA. 
This Phase IV expansion plan will be divided into two phases. The first phase 
including the above item 1-4 will be completed in 2000’ and cost RMB 2.95b. The 
required capital will come from internal cash generation and bank loan. 
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